Sumit Ganguly holds the Rabindranath Tagore Chair in Indian Cultures and Civilizations at Indian University Bloomington. His most recent book, India Since 1980, which he co-authored with Rahul Mukherji, was published last year. The political science professor talks about the book, Indian politics and the Kashmir conflict, among other issues. Here are the excerpts of the interview:
What is the significance of 1980s for India?
The significance of 1980s is really two-fold. At one level, it simply is a book series that looks at major countries - Brazil, India, Mexico, the United States,China, Russia - from 1980 onwards. In the case of India, in many ways it works out for some really unusual reason. Think about it: the Soviet invasion ofAfghanistan took place in December 1979, which had a profound impact on the Indian foreign policy from 1980 onwards because it put India in a very awkward position, having to not overly criticize the Soviet invasion because it was so dependent on Soviet weaponry. In terms of India's economic policy, there is debate about whether or not Mrs. (Indira) Gandhi, in her last year (as prime minister), had actually started to tinker with the Indian economy and to start opening up the Indian economy. Thirdly, in the realm of social mobilization, one sees a dramatic upsurge in the 1980s, with Dalits increasingly becoming more assertive, Muslims no longer voting in predictable ways for the Congress party - voting in a much more strategic fashion for local parties thereby changing the complexion of Indian politics. And fourth, that's also the time when one starts to see the slow rise of the BJP, which begins in my judgment undermines Indian secularism.
How strong is the foundation of Indian secularism? Do you think the BJP has hit the ceiling?
I definitely think the BJP has hit the ceiling. In fact, the BJP is sort of rudderless right now. I think that (Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra) Modi did them inestimable damage. Not that Mr. Modi was alone in that - there were some very tragic and appalling incidents that took place during the BJP's tenure in office. And while, I think, the BJP has managed to provoke anxieties on the part of some segments of the Hindu community, I think there is a genuine sense of recoiling and horror when the tragedy of Gujarat took place. That was a kind of turning point in many ways. So while, I think, a lot more can be done to strengthen Indian secularism and not to give in to any form of communalism, Hindu or otherwise, I think the really dark days that India once faced are really behind India at the moment.
There are many in the BJP who think that Modi should be projected as the prime ministerial candidate. Do you see him ever becoming prime minister of India?
I find it extremely difficult to imagine a day when Modi could be seriously considered as the prime minister of India. For all the talk about the economic miracle that he has brought about in Gujarat, I think the memories of the tragedy of Godra will haunt him. While he may able to garner some support amongst his followers in Gujarat and elsewhere, I would be genuinely taken aback if he managed to gather significant support across India. He is a deeply divisive figure and that divisiveness, I think, is going to haunt him. And furthermore, even people who were not exemplary individuals in Indian politics, but people who are opportunistic enough will use Godra against him if he starts to gather any serious momentum.
You also talk about the new-found assertiveness of Dalits and minorities. Is the era of national parties over in India?
At least for the foreseeable future, I cannot see how either the BJP, or the Congress (coming to power on their own). And certainly not the communists - who are both fragmented and are losing support nationally. BJP is ridden with factionalism, Congress, of course, is noted for its sycophancy and its obsession with the Nehru-Gandhi family. After the drubbing they have received in Uttar Pradesh recently, one can't see how it can be rejuvenated any time in the foreseeable future as a national party. So I think regional parties increasingly will become significant in Indian politics, at least in the immediate future.
Unlike many in the west, who think that the Nehruvian era was a "lost era," you are giving it its due...
I give the Nehruvian era credit for particular sorts of development. Number 1: without Nehru, one wonders what would have happened to the Indian secularism. Here was one man who was probably the most staunch and sincere advocate of Indian secularism. To me Indian secularism is inseparable from Indian democracy. If secularism dies out in India, Indian democracy would become what Fareed Zakaria has correctly called an "illiberal democracy." It would have electoral features, it would have a certain amount of political openness, but it would no longer be a democracy that guaranteed the rights of minorities and consequently, India would be a very different country. If you think things are bad today, I can visualize a future which could be considerably worse. So we owe much to Nehru for that. Secondly, it is easy to throw out the baby with the bath water in that were it not for Nehru one wonders if one would have had the industrial spine that India enjoys today. I am not a great advocate of every feature of Nehru's economic policy, but he did lay the foundations for industrial growth in India. So that has to be acknowledged. And above all, he played a vital role in the development and in embedding democracy in India. Increasingly, as his papers are declassified, we learn of the exemplary role that one man played in educating his colleagues and in constantly urging his colleagues to follow the democratic part in India. For those reasons, I think it is important not to join this unholy chorus which suggests that the Nehruvian period was a complete waste for India. I just don't buy it.
One of Nehru's greatest legacies on the foreign policy front was the Non-Aligned Movement. Do you think he was correct in pursuing NAM?
A: Up to a point. But I think there was an important neglect of the military until 1962, when India paid an extraordinarily high price for its neglect of the military. And also because of Nehru's socialist leanings, to some degree, Nehru was harsher on the United States and its failings, and more willing to overlook the shortcomings of the Soviet Union and the Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe.
Has the character of the Indian nationalism changed in since the '80s and '90s?
Yes, most definitely. In the '80s and '90s, one saw certain features of Indian nationalism which those of us who were wedded to a secular model of nationalism found rather distressing. Also to some degree, one witnessed the rise of sub-nationalism in India with people identifying more with regions, with casts and with religious affiliations rather than thinking of themselves of as members of a composite nation with diverse strengths.
Speaking of sub-nationalism, do you see the Kashmir conflict as subnationalist in nature, or is it driven by Islamic militancy?
Quite frankly, much as one would like to blame Pakistan for the Kashmir conflict - and Pakistan certainly has its share of sins in Kashmir - but the original sin really was committed by India by the denial of the legitimate rights of Kashmiris to have a government of their own. I think India has sought to correct many of its sins in Kashmir but there is no getting around the fact that the original sin was committed by India, particularly because of India's willingness to overlook all manner of electoral shortcomings in Kashmir, which it would not have tolerated in other parts of the country. And over time, as I have argued in an earlier book, young Kashmiris tired of this kind of persistent sets of electoral malfeasance, and that's what really contributed to the uprising against India in the late 1980s. Then Pakistan steps into this breach and obviously seeks to exploit the situation to the best of its abilities.
What is the solution to the Kashmir problem in your opinion?
The real problem in Kashmir is that - unlike even in the Arab-Israeli conflict, where most sane people on both sides agree that the only thing that will work is a two-state solution and everything else is beside the point - in the Indo-Pakistani case, unfortunately, the most that you will get the thoughtful Indians to say is that we are prepared to settle along the line of control with some minor settlements along the border - making minor adjustments. Alas, you don't even get that kind of pragmatism for the most part on the Pakistani side. The additional problem in Pakistan, quite frankly, is we really do not have a good sense of where the military stands on the issue. Gen. (Pervez) Musharraf, on occasions, made certain kinds of gestures which suggested willingness to move away from long-held positions. But one wonders if he had had the confidence of the various commanders. I am not really sure. That makes the prospects of a solution that much more difficult in Kashmir.
Finally, is India prepared for the rise of China?
Well, India really needs to get serious about this issue because in many ways the country's future depends up on this. But instead of constantly focusing on competing with China, what might be a smarter strategy for India would be to simply focus on improving its own lot. Just do it because it is inherently in your interest. To reduce poverty in India, one doesn't have to bring up China; one can simply talk about the reduction of poverty, or improving the living standards of its own population because it is inherently the right thing to do. If India focuses on that, the rise of China becomes largely immaterial. If it can continue to sustain economic growth, if it can continue to pull people out of poverty, if it can deliver goods and services to larger and ever-expanding set of its own population, these in itself will take care of China's rise and devote a certain amount of money without bankrupting the exchequer to defense. These choices alone will make India a significant player in the global order.
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